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Search, Effort, and Locus of Control 
 
We test the hypothesis that locus of control – one’s perception of control over events in life – 
influences search by affecting beliefs about the efficacy of search effort in a laboratory 
experiment. We find that reservation offers and effort are increasing in the belief that one’s 
efforts influence outcomes when subjects exert effort without knowing how effort influences 
the generation of offers but are unrelated to locus of control beliefs when subjects are 
informed about the relationship between effort and offers. These effects cannot be explained 
by locus of control’s correlation with unmeasured human capital, personality traits, and the 
costs of search – alternative explanations for the relationships between locus of control and 
search behavior that cannot be ruled out using survey data – as the search task does not 
vary across treatments, which leads us to conclude that locus of control influences search 
through beliefs about the efficacy of search effort. Our findings provide evidence that locus of 
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  Few  personality  traits  studied  by  psychologists  have  generated  as  much  interest  among 
economists as locus of control, one’s beliefs concerning the relationship between one’s actions and 
outcomes in life (Rotter 1966). Individuals with an external locus of control believe that outcomes are 
primarily matters of fate or chance. At the other extreme of this continuum of beliefs, individuals 
with an internal locus of control believe outcomes depend primarily on their own efforts. Easily 
measured and recorded in surveys including the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) and 
the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), locus of control is correlated with important economic 
outcomes such as earnings (Andrisani 1977, 1981; Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity 1997; Osborne 
Groves 2005), educational attainment (Coleman and DeLeire 2003; Baron and Cobb Clark 2010; 
Piatek and Pinger 2010), and unemployed job search (Caliendo, Cobb Clark, and Uhlendorff 2010; 
McGee 2010). In spite of the widespread interest in locus of control and its obvious importance, how 
locus of control influences behavior is not well understood  given the limitations of survey data. 
While psychologists envision locus of control influencing behavior through beliefs about the efficacy 
of effort, the documented effects of locus of control could result from its correlation with unobserved 
dimensions of human capital, personality, and effort costs.  
  In this study, we aim to identify the mechanism through which locus of control influences 
behavior. Specifically, we examine the relationship between locus of control and search behavior in a 
laboratory experiment in which subjects “search” by exerting effort that influences the stochastic 
process by which monetary offers are generated. Key to our study is the fact that the laboratory 
allows us to control what subjects know about the return to effort. Subjects “search” in a limited 
information treatment in which the benefit to their effort is not made clear to them followed by a full 
information treatment in which the relationship between effort and the process by which offers are 2 
 
generated  is  fully  explained  to  them.  We  hypothesize  that  in  the  limited  information  treatment 
internal individuals who believe their actions influence outcomes will believe the rate of return to 
effort  to  be  higher  than  their  less  internal  peers  and  exert  more  effort  searching  and  set  higher 
reservation offers. We expect locus of control to have no effect on behavior in the full information 
treatment  when  there  is  no  uncertainty  about  the  relationship  between  effort  and  outcomes.  Our 
approach allows us to rule out the competing explanations for the role of locus of control. We control 
for a wider variety of psychological characteristics than are generally found in survey data, and the 
real effort task is the same in both the limited and full information treatments such that if locus of 
control’s effect stems from its correlation with unobserved dimensions of human capital, personality, 
or effort costs then its effect on search behavior should not vary across treatments. 
The experimental design is straightforward. Subjects participated in search episodes lasting 
for 21 periods. All subjects began a search episode in possession of an outside option which they 
earned in any period in which they had not accepted an offer through the 20
th period. In each period, 
subjects  had  the  opportunity  to  perform  tasks—the  experimental  analog  of  search  effort—that 
increased the probability that they receive an offer. If an offer was received, subjects decided whether 
to accept the offer and receive that amount in each subsequent period (i.e., their search ends) or 
refuse the offer and search again in the next period. In the limited information treatment, subjects 
were not informed of the relationship between completed tasks and the probability of receiving an 
offer,  while  in  the  full  information  treatment  they  were  made  aware  that  each  completed  task 
increased the probability of receiving an offer by four percentage points. The distribution of potential 
offers was common knowledge in all search episodes. In periods during which a subject searched in 
the limited information treatment, the subject was asked what he/she believed the probability that an 
offer would be received was, and subjects reported in both treatments in periods involving search 3 
 
their reservation offer before learning whether they received an offer.  Finally, subjects completed a 
survey collecting information on the subject’s background, locus of control, risk preferences, and 
personality traits using standard measures found in survey data.  
In section II, we present a search model in which locus of control influences beliefs about the 
efficacy of search effort. More internal individuals believe themselves more likely to receive an offer 
conditional on any amount of effort than less internal searchers; they set higher reservation offers as a 
result. Likewise, more internal individuals perceive the marginal benefit to search effort to be higher 
than less internal individuals and exert more effort as a result. Consistent with these predictions, we 
find that reservation offers and effort are positively related to internality in the limited information 
treatment. A one standard deviation increase in internality is associated with an estimated increase in 
reservation offers of 1.2 experimental currency units (ECUs) and an estimated increase of 0.9 items 
completed in a sample in which offers range from 5 to 45 ECUs and subjects average nearly 10 items 
completed per period. By contrast, we find no evidence that locus of control is related to reservation 
offers or items completed in the full information treatment.  
McGee (2010) and Caliendo et al. (2010) find that internality is positively related to search 
effort  and  reservation  wages  among  unemployed  job  seekers  using  the  NLSY79  and  GSOEP, 
respectively. More internal job seekers, however, may expend more effort and hold out for higher 
wages because they are, in fact, better at searching or because they know that skills correlated with 
locus of control and unobserved by econometricians make them more desirable to employers than 
less internal individuals. Alternatively, more internal individuals may be less bothered by expending 
effort on search. These alternative explanations for the correlations between locus of control and 
search behavior cannot generally be ruled out using survey data, but they also cannot explain the 
differences observed across treatments in our experiment. Given that the only difference between the 4 
 
treatments is what the subjects know about the return to effort, an effect of locus of control on beliefs 
about the efficacy of effort can explain these observed differences in behavior. 
Studying the connection between beliefs about the return to effort and job search is, in part, 
motivated by the phenomenon of discouraged workers who enter long term non employment because 
they  no  longer  believe  that  they  can  find  a  job  (Schweitzer  &  Smith  1974).  Surprisingly, 
discouragement  presents  itself  in  this  short  experiment  as  in  29%  and  12%  of  subject period 
observations in the limited and full information treatments, respectively, subjects “quit” in that they 
either choose to complete no tasks or stop attempting tasks before their time allotment expires. This 
phenomenon  is  strongly  related  to  subjects’  locus  of  control  as  more  external  individuals  are 
substantially more likely to “quit” than their more internal peers. 
Our findings contribute  to the growing labor literature studying the relationships between 
personality and “soft” skills and labor market outcomes, but the study also contributes to a well 
established literature concerning experimental labor markets.  As articulated in Falk and Fehr (2003), 
the laboratory provides an excellent methodological tool because it affords the experimenter control 
over a number of aspects of the labor market environment.  Early studies with exogenous offer arrival 
rates (Braunstein & Schotter 1981, 1982; Cox & Oaxaca 1989) exploited this control to demonstrate 
that the predictions of job search models with respect to reservation wages are borne out in the 
laboratory.  Recent experimental studies have investigated how factors beyond the scope of standard 
job search models such as wait times (Brown et al. 2011) and self image (Falk et al 2006) influence 
subjects’ search choices.  In this vein, ours is the first study to leverage the control afforded by the 
laboratory to examine the effects of locus of control on search. 
From a policy point of view, our findings have two important implications. First, we show in 
an additional treatment that providing searchers with information concerning the experiences of past 5 
 
searchers—how much effort they exerted and whether they received an offer—can reduce searchers’ 
reliance on locus of control beliefs that may introduce a behavioral bias causing them to search too 
little or hold out for excessively high wages. This suggests that fairly minimal counseling for the 
unemployed  can  be  welfare enhancing.  Second,  our  findings  indicate  that  programs  supporting 
unemployed job seekers can identify individuals at risk of becoming discouraged and exiting the 
labor market using simple measures of locus of control beliefs.  
While we have labor market search in mind, our findings in the abstract laboratory setting 
provide  insight  into  how  locus  of  control  will  affect  decision making  in  settings  ranging  from 
investment behavior to spousal search to consumer search. Specifically, our findings suggest that in 
any setting requiring effort choices in which the return to effort is uncertain, locus of control will 
influence both how much effort the individual exerts and how selective the individual is—insights 
which have important practical implications.  For instance, marketers and internet dating sites might 
wish to target external individuals who would otherwise exert less effort searching on their own.  
Marketers may want to “de bias” internal individuals to induce them to purchase rather than holding 
out for a “steal.”  While locus of control undoubtedly affects behavior in these settings, determining 
how is only possible through an experimental study such as ours. 
II. Search Model 
We  model  search  over  a  finite  horizon  (  = 1,2,…,21)	with  endogenous  search  effort 
determining the probability of receiving an offer in any period. Searchers receive an outside offer (a 
search subsidy),   , in every period in which they have not previously accepted an offer received 
through their search through the 20
th period; they receive nothing in the 21
st period if they have not 
accepted  an  offer.  The  offers      are  drawn  from  a  discrete  distribution  in  which 
   ∈    ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,     and  ∑ Pr     = 1  
    .  In  any  period  before  an  offer  has  been 6 
 
accepted, the individual chooses how much effort to exert    ∈  0,1,…, ̅  and a reservation offer   
  
such that only offers greater than or equal to   
  are accepted. If an offer is accepted in period t, the 
subject receives this amount in every period from t+1 through and including the 21
st period. The 
effort exerted determines the probability that an offer is received:   




where        = 1 indicates that an offer is received in period t and   represents the productivity of 
search effort. The costs of search effort are given by  (  ) where  ′ > 0, ′′ > 0. The period utility 
given an offer   in hand is  ( ), and we assume that  (0) = 0 and  (0) = 0. For convenience, we 
assume that individuals do not discount future periods. 
The searcher chooses effort and a reservation offer to maximize the present value of search 
  
  =  (  ) −  (  ) +     Pr(  ≥   
 )(21 −  )   ( )|  ≥   
   
+(1 −     Pr(  ≥   
 ))    
   
Given  that     
  = 0,  this  maximization  problem  can  be  solved  recursively  in  a  straightforward 
fashion, but solving for this solution is complicated by the fact that the cost of real effort is known 
only to the individual, an issue we discuss in the next section. 
  We assume, however, that individuals are uncertain about the return to search effort,  , and 
choose search effort and reservation offers to maximize instead 
 (  
 ) =  (  ) −  (  ) +    |    
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where  the  individual’s  subjective  estimate  of  the  return  to  effort,       |    
   ,
   
,         
   ,
   
,  , 
depends on prior search effort choices, outcomes, and individual characteristics   that inform the 
individual’s prior regarding the return to search effort. As individuals acquire search experience, they 7 
 
should update away from this prior based on their experiences, but the factors X will have a persistent 
effect  on  behavior  to  the  extent  that  prior  beliefs  continue  to  affect  behavior.  Among  the 
characteristics included in X is an individual’s locus of control. Similar to the labor contracts model 
of Bowles et al. (2001), we assume that an individual’s subjective estimate of the return to search 
effort is increasing in one’s sense of control, internality. That is, 
    |    
   ,
   
,        
   ,
   
,  ,
 	      > 0, where 
       is  increasing  in  internality.  The  model’s  key  testable  predictions  are  that  more  internal 
individuals will exert greater effort in each period and hold out for higher reservation offers than less 
internal individuals (see McGee (2010) or Caliendo et al. (2010) for derivations of these predictions 
in  similar  settings).  More  internal  searchers  expect  to  receive  an  offer  with  higher  probability 
conditional on any amount of search effort than less internal searchers, so they hold out for higher 
offers. Similarly, more internal searchers believe the marginal return to search effort to be higher than 
less internal searchers, so they exert more effort. 
III. Experimental Design and Data 
Subjects  were  undergraduate  students  at  The  Ohio  State  University  randomly  invited  to 
participate in sessions lasting just over two hours each. In each session, subjects participated in 2 4 
search  episodes  and  completed  a  short  questionnaire.  Subjects  were  informed  that  each  search 
episode would last 21 periods, that they would only earn experimental currency units (ECUs) in the 
21
st period of a search episode if they had accepted an offer in an earlier period, that they would earn 
the outside option (15 ECUs) in every period prior to accepting an offer (except for the 21
st period), 
and that at the end of the experiment earnings in ECUs would be converted to dollars at a rate of 100 
ECUs to $1. Offers generated by search effort were drawn from the discrete distribution with seven 
points  of  support  described  in  table  1,  and  this  distribution  was  explained  to  subjects  in  the 
instructions (provided in the Appendix) prior to the experiment.   8 
 
At the beginning of each period before an offer had been accepted, subjects “searched” by 
performing a coding task. Subjects were given a key matching ten words to ten four digit numbers. 
The key was followed by seven multiple choice questions, each listing a word and five four digit 
numbers with the correct answer being the four digit number corresponding to the word in the key. 
After completing a set of seven questions, subjects moved on to a new set of word number pairings 
and questions (“items”). Screenshots of the interface used by subjects in the limited information and 
full information treatments are provided in figures 1a and 1b, respectively. Subjects had 90 seconds 
to correctly code as many items as they could, though they were not required to complete any items 
and could either complete no items or exit the coding task and move on if they so chose. We use the 
coding task because of the limited skill involved: subjects need only to be able to read as the correct 
answer  to  every  question  is  given  in  the  key.  While  there  are  likely  modest  differences  among 
subjects in their ability to navigate the interface and code items, we assume that differences in the 
number of items coded reflect differences in effort exerted rather than differences in ability. 
  The number of items correctly coded in a period determines the probability of receiving an 
offer in that period. In all treatments, each item correctly coded increases the probability of receiving 
an offer by four percentage points, i.e.,  
Pr(       = 1) =  0.04 ∗ (# of items completed) if # of completed items	 ≤ 25	
1	otherwise
 
In the limited information search episode, subjects were not told how correctly coded items affected 
the probability of receiving of an offer. Subjects were told that, “The number of items you complete 
in the word coding task may affect whether or not you receive an offer during a period.” In the full 
information treatment, subjects were explicitly informed of the relationship between correctly coded 
items and the probability of receiving an offer. Following the coding task in the limited information 
treatment, subjects were asked three questions. First, “How many items do you think you correctly 9 
 
completed?” Second, “What do you think the probability is that you receive an offer? Please enter a 
number between 0 and 100, where 0 means that you will definitely not receive an offer and 100 
means that you definitely will receive an offer.” Third, “If you receive an offer in this period, what 
would the offer have to be for you to accept it?” We use this measure of self reported reservation 
offers to generate data comparable to the reservation wage data found in surveys such as the NLSY79 
and GSOEP elicited using similarly worded questions. 
  After answering these questions, subjects learned whether they had received an offer and the 
amount of the offer if one was received. Subjects who received an offer were asked if they wished to 
accept the offer and receive it in all remaining periods. If subjects accepted an offer, their search 
episode ended. If they did not receive an offer or declined an offer, they moved to the next period and 
repeated this process, beginning with the coding task. Subjects moved from period to period until 
they had accepted an offer. If no offer had been accepted by the end of the twentieth period, the 
search episode ended and subjects were paid the outside option for 20 periods. The full information 
treatment  proceeded  in  the  same  fashion,  but  subjects  were  not  asked  their  beliefs  about  the 
probability of receiving an offer. 
  Subjects in all sessions completed the limited and full information treatments with the limited 
information search episode always coming first. Subjects in some sessions also completed one of two 
additional  treatments.  In  the  partial  information  treatment,  subjects  were  provided  information 
concerning the experiences of prior subjects. Specifically, subjects were told how many items 60 
subjects had completed, whether the subject received an offer, and the amount of the offer if one was 10 
 
received. The information sheet given to subjects is provided in Figure 2.
1 In all other respects, the 
partial information treatment was exactly the same as the limited information treatment, and subjects 
always  completed  the  partial  information  treatment  between  the  limited  information  and  full 
information  treatments.  In  limited  and  full  information  “pseudo effort”  treatments,  subjects 
purchased items instead of completing the coding task. The relationship between items purchased and 
the  probability  of  receiving  an  offer  was  the  same  as  in  the  real effort  treatments:  each  item 
purchased increased the probability of receiving an offer by four percentage points. In the pseudo 
effort limited information treatment, subjects were told that the number of items purchased “may 
affect” whether an offer would be received, while in the full information pseudo effort treatment 
subjects were told exactly how items purchased affected the probability of receiving an offer. The 
costs of purchasing n items was 0.10  , and the user interface allowed subjects to calculate the costs 
of any number of items they were considering purchasing. Costs incurred over the course of a search 
episode  were  deducted  from  the  subject’s  show up  fee.  Subjects  completing  the  pseudo effort 
treatments completed four search episodes: the limited and full information real effort treatments and 
the limited and full information pseudo effort treatments. The limited information real and pseudo 
effort treatments always preceded the full information treatments, but we varied the order of the 
pseudo and real effort treatments across sessions.
2   
After  completing  the  search  episodes,  subjects  completed  a  questionnaire  including  the 
abbreviated,  four item  Rotter  Internal External  Locus  of  Control  Scale  used  in  the  NLSY79 
                                                           
1 While the sample of prior experiences provided to subjects was drawn randomly from the actual 
experiences of prior subjects, we selected a sample in which a regression of whether an offer was 
received on items completed resulted in an estimated slope of approximately 0.04. 
2 We observe no differences related to the orderings of the real and pseudo effort treatments.  11 
 
measuring general locus of control beliefs (Rotter, 1966), a fifty item Big Five inventory measuring 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and imaginativeness or intellect 
(Goldberg,  1992),  the  Rosenberg  Self Esteem  Scale  (Rosenberg,  1965),  and  the  Life  Orientation 
Test Revised designed to assess individual differences in generalized optimism versus pessimism 
(Scheier et al., 1994). In addition, subjects completed the low stakes risk preference measure from 
Holt and Laury (2002) used in the experimental literature and risk preference measures from the 
GSOEP and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) (also used in the NLSY79). Finally, subjects 
were asked how much they would pay to avoid having to complete 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and 24 coding 
items as well as questions concerning demographics and achievement test scores.  
For the personality measures and achievement scores, we standardize the variables within the 
sample to have mean zero and standard deviation one to facilitate comparisons of the effects of the 
different measures on behavior. To create a measure of how onerous or costly the subjects find the 
coding task, we rank the subjects according to the cost they report for completing a given number of 
items. The cost measure then takes the average decile for the subject’s responses to the 8 item, 12 
item, and 16 item cost questions.
3 The questionnaire components are provided in the Appendix. 
  The sessions are summarized in table 2. Subjects were paid a flat $6 show up fee in addition 
to their earnings from each search episode  and  the Holt Laury instrument.  In total, 155 subjects 
provided 1,410 subject period observations in the limited information real effort treatment and 1,287 
subject period observations in the full information real effort treatment.  
Table 3 details the mean reservation offer and number of items correctly completed by period 
in the limited and full information treatments as well as the theoretically optimal choices in a full 
                                                           
3 Alternative methods of constructing the self reported cost measure produced results similar to those 
reported in section V.  12 
 
information setting for risk neutral searchers ( ( ) =  ) whose search effort costs are given by 
2 10 . 0 ) ( t t s s c − = .
4  Reservation  offers  decrease  significantly  over  time  in  both  the  limited  and  full 
information treatments, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction in a finite horizon and Cox 
and Oaxaca’s (1989) findings in a laboratory experiment without endogenous search effort. While the 
model predicts that search effort will decline over time, search effort is relatively constant in both 
treatments, which may reflect the imposition of the 90 second time limit, a practical necessity. The 
average number of items completed is higher in the full information treatment than in the limited 
information treatment in all 20 periods. In the early periods, this may be a result of the subjects’ 
inexperience with the coding task in the limited information treatment, but the persistence of the 
difference suggests that subjects exert more effort on average when the return to effort is certain. 
  Table  4  reports  the  summary  statistics  for  the  control  variables  and  the  demographic 
composition of our sample. In the regression analysis, we use standardized versions of the control 
variables, but table 4 reveals substantial variation in the underlying raw scores—especially locus of 
control scores which range from 6 to 16 with a standard deviation of 2.43. Not all subjects reported 
ACT and SAT scores. When constructing the standardized achievement measure used in section V, 
we use the ACT score when available and then supplement with the average of available SAT scores 
when the ACT score is missing.  
                                                           
4 We estimate a cost function in terms of ECUs of  (  ) = −7.0 + 5.0   + 0.3  
  using subjects’ self 
reported  costs  of  completing  items,  which  appears  to  dramatically  overstate  costs  as  in  the  full 
information setting it would imply zero effort in all periods. Subjects, who report costs in dollars, 
may have difficulty articulating costs prior to receiving their earnings. The prediction of declining 
reservation wages over time, however, does not depend on the exact shape of the cost function, and 
the self reported costs indicate that the cost function is at least quasi convex for all subjects. 13 
 
  A particular strength of our study is that we observe a large set of personality traits, and table 
5 documents the pairwise correlations between these traits, risk preferences and locus of control. 
Internality  is  significantly  and  positively  correlated  with  optimism  (0.34),  self esteem  (0.38), 
extroversion (0.33) and conscientiousness (0.30). As one could imagine a role for all of these traits in 
search,  controlling  for  them  is  necessary  to  identify  the  direct  effects  of  locus  of  control.  For 
example, a searcher may believe that the probability of receiving an offer is equal to   +    	, where 
a is the probability of receiving an offer independent of effort. As a searcher’s expectation regarding 
a increases, the searcher will hold out for higher offers, but search effort will not be affected as the 
marginal return to search effort remains the same. If general optimism is positively correlated with 
beliefs about a, then omitting optimism would introduce a positive omitted variables bias in the 
estimated coefficient of locus of control in reservation wage models. 
IV. Econometric Strategy 
  Our  primary  hypotheses  are  that  locus  of  control  influences  beliefs  about  the  efficacy  of 
search effort and that these beliefs, in turn, influence actual search behavior. To test whether locus of 
control influences beliefs about the return to search effort in the limited information treatment, we 
estimate by OLS 
         (       = 1) =    +          +     +    +      (1) 
where           (       = 1)  denotes  subject  i’s  self reported  estimate  of  the  probability  of 
receiving an offer in period t when the subject is still searching,        the subject’s locus of control 
score, and    a vector of measures of self esteem, generalized optimism, risk preferences, personality 
traits and self reported effort costs. We allow for a linear time trend in beliefs by including t, and    is 14 
 
the stochastic error term.
5 If more internal individuals believe the return to search effort to be higher 
than  their  less  internal  peers  and  complete  more  items  as  a  result,  then  the  effect  of  increasing 
internality (  ) should be positive in this reduced form specification.  
To test how locus of control affects reservation offers, we estimate by OLS for each treatment 
           =    +          +     +    +       (2) 
If locus of control influences beliefs about the return to search effort, then individuals will hold out 
for higher offers and   should be positive in the limited information treatment and zero in the full 
information treatment in which subjects face no uncertainty about the return to effort. If, however, 
internality is positively correlated with ability or negatively correlated with psychic effort costs not 
captured by our controls, then the effect of increasing internality will be positive in both treatments.  
Finally, we estimate by OLS for each treatment 
        =    +          +     +    +           (3) 
where         denotes the number of correctly coded items in period t. Increasing internality (  ) 
should be positively related to search effort in the limited information treatment and unrelated to 
search effort in the full information treatment if locus of control influences effort through beliefs 
about the efficacy of effort rather than its correlation with ability or effort costs.  
In all of the results in the next two sections, we report Huber White standard errors correcting 
for the non independence of observations at the subject level. 
V. Findings  
  Subjects clearly believe that the number of items that they correctly complete is related to the 
probability that they will receive an offer. The estimates in columns 1 and 2 of table 6 indicate that 
                                                           
5 More flexible approaches to modeling the time trends in all of our specifications yielded similar 
results to those reported in the next section. 15 
 
subjects’ beliefs about the probability of receiving an offer in the limited information treatment are 
increasing in the number of items they correctly complete allowing for either a linear time trend in 
beliefs (column 1) or the use of beliefs in the prior period as an “anchor” for beliefs in the current 
period (column 2). Each correctly completed item is associated with an estimated increase in the 
probability of receiving an offer of between 0.9 and 1.4 percentage points. While we are interested in 
how locus of control beliefs influence beliefs about the marginal return to effort, the number items 
subjects complete is itself a function of locus of locus of control. As such, column 3 reports the 
results of the reduced form model of beliefs regarding the probability of receiving an offer detailed in 
equation 1. We do not find direct evidence of a relationship between self reported beliefs and locus of 
control in column 3—although as we report below we find strong evidence that locus of control 
influences the number of items completed. The effect of locus of control on beliefs is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. We do, however, find that subjects’ stated beliefs are related to other 
personality traits. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in optimism is associated with an 
estimated 5.2 percentage point increase in subjects’ reported beliefs about the probability of receiving 
an  offer,  while  comparable  increases  in  extroversion  (Big  1)  and  conscientiousness  (Big  3)  are 
associated with lower reported beliefs regarding the likelihood of receiving an offer.  
  While we suspect subjects had difficulty articulating their beliefs, they had no such difficulty 
articulating reservation offers. Subjects’ responses to the reservation offer question were non binding 
in that they were free to accept an offer less than their  reported reservation offer. Nevertheless, 
subjects adhere to their stated reservation offer policy in 90% and 89% of subject period observations 
in the limited and full information treatments, respectively, in which the subject received an offer. 
Furthermore, columns 1, 2, and 5 of table 7 make clear that subjects’ reservation offers are positively 
related  to  their  beliefs  regarding  the  probability of  receiving  an  offer  in  the  limited  information 16 
 
treatment and the number of items completed in both treatments as we would expect. Column 3 
reports the estimated marginal effects in the limited information treatment from the reservation offer 
regression  described  in  equation  2.  Consistent  with  the  model’s  prediction,  locus  of  control  is 
positively related to reservation offers when subjects are uncertain about the return to effort: a one 
standard  deviation  increase  in  internality is  associated with a 1.156 ECU increase in reservation 
offers. By contrast, the estimates for the same model in the full information treatment in column 6 
indicate that there is no relationship between locus of control and reservation offers when subjects 
know exactly how effort affects the probability of receiving an offer.  
Columns 4 and 7 report estimates from specifications identical to those in columns 3 and 6 
using  the  log  of  the  reservation  offers  as  the  dependent  variable  to  facilitate  comparisons  with 
findings from survey data.
6 Caliendo et al. (2010) and McGee (2010) find that one standard deviation 
increases in internality are associated with increases in reservation wages of 1.6 and 1.5 percentage 
points,  respectively.  In  the  limited  information  treatment,  we  find  that  a  one  standard  deviation 
increase in internality is associated with a 4.9 percentage point increase in reservation offers. The 
substantially larger effect of locus of control in our experimental setting likely reflects the fact that in 
real search individuals are typically not wholly ignorant of the job market and understand—in many 
cases from experience—how their search effort affects outcomes, leaving a circumscribed role for 
locus of control in determining beliefs about the connection between job search effort and outcomes. 
In  our  setting,  however,  subjects  have  no  idea  how  effort  is  related  to  outcomes  and  no  prior 
experience to draw upon when forming their expectations. As such, locus of control likely plays a 
more significant role in determining behavior in our experimental setting than in actual job search. 
                                                           
6 Because some subjects report reservation offers of 0, these specifications require that we drop a 
small number of subject period observations in both treatments. 17 
 
  Two additional interesting facts emerge from table 7. First, risk aversion as measured by the 
lottery question from the HRS has both a statistically and economically significant negative effect on 
reservation wages in the limited information treatment. A one standard deviation increase in risk 
aversion is associated with an estimated 1.8 ECU decrease in reservation offers (a 6.5 percentage 
point decrease in the log reservation offer specification). Risk averse individuals hedge against the 
possibility of not getting an offer in subsequent periods by being more willing to accept offers in the 
current period, and this effect is more pronounced in the environment with more uncertainty—the 
limited information treatment. Omitting risk preferences from the specification in column 4 results in 
a 15% decline in the estimated coefficient of locus of control. Second, we find that reservation wages 
are  positively  related  an  individual’s  optimism  in  both  treatments—although  not  statistically 
significant at conventional levels. One standard deviation increases in optimism are associated with 
predicted increases of 1.1 ECUs (p value 0.11) and 1.2 ECUs (p value 0.17) in the limited and full 
information treatments, respectively. Omitting the control for optimism pessimism results in a 21% 
increase in the estimated coefficient of locus of control in the limited information treatment because 
of the positive correlation between internality and optimism.  
  The evidence from survey data concerning the relationship between search effort and locus of 
control is limited by the difficulty of measuring job search effort in surveys. That is, should one 
measure effort using the number of search methods used (e.g., help wanted ads, referrals by friends, 
placement services), the number of job applications submitted (Caliendo et al. 2010), the number of 
hours per week spent searching (McGee 2010), or some other measure? By contrast, search effort is 
well defined in our experiment, and the relationship in the limited information treatment between 
locus of control and search effort is among the study’s most robust findings. Table 8 reports the 
estimated marginal effects from the models of the number of correctly completed items in the limited 18 
 
and full information treatments detailed in equation 3. When subjects are uncertain regarding the 
return  to  effort,  internality  is  positively  related  to  effort:  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
internality is associated with a predicted increase in items completed of 0.94 items in the limited 
information treatment but no effect in the full information treatment. Given that subjects average only 
around 10 items per period, this constitutes a significant increase in effort—though smaller than the 
20  percent  increase  in  hours  spent  searching  per  week  associated  with  a  one  standard  deviation 
increase in internality that McGee (2010) finds. One might suspect that locus of control affects effort 
because it proxies for diligence or is related to the psychic costs of effort. As noted, however, we 
control directly for personality traits including conscientiousness and self reported effort costs. More 
importantly, the task in both treatments is the same. If the effect of locus of control is not related to 
the uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of effort, we would not expect to see the differences in the 
effects of locus of control on reservation offers and effort across treatments that we do.  
  To explore the role that real effort plays in our findings, we report the estimated marginal 
effects from the pseudo effort treatments in table 9. We find no evidence of relationships between 
locus of control and beliefs, reservation offers,  and items purchased in  either the limited or full 
information treatments when subjects simply purchase items. The estimated marginal effect of locus 
of control on reservation offers in the pseudo effort limited information treatment (3.369) is large and 
positive but imprecisely estimated. Locus of control appears to strongly influence search behavior 
only when uncertainty surrounds the role of real effort. One possible explanation is that subjects 
learn  about  the  search  technology  more  quickly  in  the  pseudo effort  treatment.  In  the  limited 
information  treatments,  the  standard  deviations  of  the  average  number  of  items  completed  or 
purchased are 4.83 and 7.52 in the real effort and pseudo effort treatments, respectively. In nine of 
the first ten periods, the standard deviation of average number items completed or purchased in that 19 
 
period in the pseudo effort treatment is higher than—and in most cases twice as large as—that in the 
real effort treatment. When uncertain about the return to items completed or purchased, subjects may 
experiment more when they simply purchase items and do not face the physical constraints in the 
coding  task.  Through  this  experimentation  subjects  can  learn  about  the  search  technology  more 
quickly—thereby reducing the importance of their locus of control beliefs. 
  We  also  test  the  robustness  of  our  results  to  the  use  of  different  controls.  Our  preferred 
measure of risk preferences is the instrument used in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 
in order to facilitate comparisons between our findings and those from studies using survey data. 
Table 10  reports the estimated marginal  effects in our preferred specifications replacing the  risk 
preference  measure  from  the  HRS/NLSY79  with  the  Holt Laury  risk  preference  measure.  The 
estimated marginal effects of locus of control are virtually identical to those in table 6 8, although the 
relationship between locus of control and reservation offers is not significant at conventional levels 
(p value 0.119).  In results available from the  authors, the estimated marginal effects of locus  of 
control in our preferred specifications using the GSOEP risk preference measure are also virtually 
identical to those in table 6 8, but the effects of risk preferences are not precisely estimated.  
  Finally, studies examining the effects of locus of control using survey data typically attempt 
to control for ability using test scores (e.g., Coleman & DeLeire 2003; Osborne Groves 2005). More 
internal individuals may believe their effort to be more efficacious because it actually is if internality 
is positively correlated with ability. As such, controlling for ability is important in non experimental 
settings.  In  our  analysis,  the  skill  required  is  the  same  in  both  treatments,  so  we  do  not  expect 
unobserved  ability  to  lead  to  an  observed  difference  in  the  effects  of  locus  of  control  across 
treatments. Furthermore, we would argue that including achievement scores as a control for ability in 20 
 
our reduced form specifications is inappropriate as ample evidence suggests that achievement itself is 
a function of locus of control (Findley & Cooper 1983).  
Nevertheless,  we  report  in  table  11  the  estimated  marginal  effects  from  our  preferred 
specifications in both treatments including our standardized achievement measure as a control. The 
estimates again indicate that internality is positively related to reservation offers and effort in the 
limited information treatment. Neither estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels (p 
values of 0.119 and 0.133, respectively), which is at least in part due to the smaller samples that 
result  from  missing  achievement  scores.  The  estimated  marginal  effect  of  locus  of  control  on 
reservation  offers  (1.291)  is  virtually  identical  to  that  reported  in  table  7,  while  the  estimated 
marginal effect on effort (0.571) is roughly 40% smaller than the estimate in table 8. We find no 
evidence of a relationship between locus of control and reservation offers in the full information 
treatment, and a negative relationship between internality and effort in the full information treatment. 
Achievement scores are positively related to effort in both treatments, but the differences across 
treatments in locus of control’s effects cannot be explained by a correlation with unobserved ability.  
  In summary, we are unable to document a direct effect of locus of control on beliefs. We find, 
however, strong indirect evidence in support of the hypothesis that locus of control influences search 
behavior  through  an  influence  on  beliefs  about  the  efficacy  of  effort.  Specifically,  we  find  that 
reservation offers and effort are positively and significantly related to internality when subjects are 
uncertain about the efficacy of effort but wholly unrelated to internality when the connection between 
effort and outcomes is public information. The skill content of the task and the effort required of 
subjects are the same across treatments—meaning that a correlation between locus of control and 
unobserved skill or effort costs cannot explain the observed treatment effects.  
VI. Extensions 21 
 
  The evidence in the preceding section suggests that locus of control is closely related to the 
two decisions all job seekers make—reservation wage and effort choices—that determine the length 
of unemployment spells. Two extensions to our main results inform how programs can assist the 
unemployed in a welfare enhancing fashion and identify job seekers at risk of becoming discouraged 
and exiting the labor force. First, some job training programs seek to help participants develop a more 
internal locus of control and increase their general sense of self efficacy (Dextraze 1986; Eden & 
Aviram 1993). While encouraging job seekers to take charge of their affairs is undoubtedly a good 
thing  among  external  job  seekers  who  would  otherwise  remain  on  the  couch,  increasing  the 
internality of job seekers is not an unambiguously welfare enhancing intervention given the effect 
internality has on reservation wages. Very internal job seekers may “make the perfect the enemy of 
the good” and hold out for excessively high wages. Moreover, determining which job seekers are too 
internal or too external in the context of job search would be nearly impossible. The only way to 
increase the expected utility of job seekers is to properly “calibrate” their beliefs about the efficacy of 
search.  Many job seekers—especially young people with little experience looking for work—have 
no idea how much or how hard to search. They may rely on their general perceptions of how the 
world works—i.e., general locus of control and optimism pessimism beliefs—when choosing how 
much effort to put into search. Providing job seekers with information about how the job market 
works and how much effort others exerted in job searches in similar occupations or industries can 
reduce their reliance on general beliefs when forming beliefs about the job market.  
To this end, some subjects in our experiment participated in a partial information treatment in 
which they were provided with information concerning the experiences of prior subjects. Table 12 
reports  the  coefficient  estimates  from  our  preferred  specifications  of  the  models  of  beliefs, 
reservation offers, and items completed in this partial information treatment. While the sample sizes 22 
 
are small, the coefficient estimates in columns 2 and 3 provide no evidence indicating that subjects’ 
locus of control beliefs play a role in determining their reservation offer and effort choices when 
subjects have some information concerning the experiences of the other subjects. Counseling that 
provides young or inexperienced job seekers with information concerning the job search experiences 
of others may be a straightforward and effective way to eliminate behavioral biases that result from  
locus of control beliefs and increase the expected utility of job seekers.  
  Second,  identifying  job  seekers  at  risk  of  becoming  discouraged  would  help  assistance 
programs target resources at these individuals. One might expect discouragement to be minimal in a 
two hour experiment, but this proved not to be the case. We define “quitting” in any period to mean 
that either the subject completes no items or stopped coding before the end of the 90 second coding 
window.
7 Subjects exhibiting this behavior chose to exert less effort than other subjects and did so in 
an extreme fashion. We estimate a probit models of the probability of quitting in which a subject 
quits (       = 1) whenever       
∗ ≥ 0 and        = 0 otherwise where       
∗  is the latent index  
      
∗ =          +     +    +                             (4) 
  Table 13 reports the estimated marginal effects in the limited information treatment (column 
1) and the full information treatment (column 2). In both treatments, internality is negatively related 
to the probability of quitting, although the effect is not statistically significant in the full information 
treatment and roughly half the magnitude of the estimated marginal effect in the limited information 
treatment. In the limited information treatment, a one standard deviation increase in internality is 
associated with a reduction in the predicted probability of quitting in any period of 7.5 percentage 
                                                           
7 As seen in figure 1, subjects could exit the coding task at any time by clicking a “Stop” button. 
Because a period only ended when all subjects still searching finished the coding task, quitting did 
not help subjects to reduce their time in the lab.  23 
 
points. Of the personality traits, only emotional stability has a comparable effect on the probability of 
quitting. The decision to quit appears to be closely related to locus of control beliefs—especially 
when subjects are uncertain about the return to their effort.  
Our findings concerning discouragement complement those of Falk et al. (2006) who study 
search in an experiment in which the effectiveness of subjects’ search depends on their type. Subjects 
are uncertain about their type—the real world analog of which would be their relative ability or 
desirability to potential employers—which they learn about through experience searching, which is 
costly. Unlucky initial search experiences lead some subjects to infer their type to be “lower” than it 
actually is and quit searching prematurely believing the costs to outweigh the expected benefits. 
Searchers become discouraged by dint of perfectly rational Bayesian updating. Our findings also 
suggest  that  discouragement  can  result  from  uncertainty  about  the  return  to  search,  but  this 
uncertainty need not concern one’s type. Instead, discouragement may be the result of a behavioral 
bias stemming from locus of control beliefs that inclines external searchers to believe search effort to 
be less effective than it actually is at the outset of their search episode. Unlucky search experiences 
can reinforce this bias and lead external searchers to give up.  
That unlucky experiences might reinforce external beliefs leading to discouragement is not 
inconsistent or incompatible with the explanation offered by Falk et al. The difference between the 
two  explanations,  however,  has  important  implications  for  programs  attempting  to  prevent  job 
seekers from becoming discouraged. Identifying job seekers who will be unlucky in the sense that 
conditional on their search effort and desirability to potential employers they will receive fewer offers 
than  they  could  reasonably  expect  is  a  fool’s  errand.  Identifying  job  seekers  who  are  relatively 
external and hence most at risk of becoming discouraged, on the other hand, is relatively easy with a 24 
 
short questionnaire and could prove to be a viable approach to targeting resources at unemployed job 
seekers most in need of assistance—or simply encouragement.  
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
Success in labor markets depends on conventional human capital such as education, training, 
and cognitive ability, but it also depends on one’s personality, social skills, patience, risk preferences, 
and other less easily measured but no less important “soft skills.” Measures of many soft skills are 
available in longitudinal surveys, and economists have shown an increased willingness to explore 
their  role  in  behavior  (e.g.,  Borghans,  ter  Weel,  &  Weinberg  2008).  In  many  cases,  however, 
economists have remained agnostic about what these measures of soft skills actually measure and 
how  they  influence  behavior  (e.g.,  Heckman,  Stixrud,  &  Urzua  2006).  The  laboratory  affords 
economists the opportunity to identify what soft skills these survey instruments actually measure and 
how they influence behavior—and this is precisely the goal of this study regarding locus of control. 
If locus of control affects beliefs about the efficacy of effort—as psychologists believe it 
does—then internal job seekers will set higher reservation wages and exert more effort looking for 
work. Consistent with these expectations, internality is positively related to reservation wages and 
search  effort  among  unemployed  job  seekers  in  survey  data.  Alternative  explanations  for  the 
correlation between locus of control and search behavior, however, cannot be ruled out using survey 
data. First, locus of control may be correlated with unobserved personal characteristics that influence 
the desirability of the job seeker as an employee. Second, the process of looking for work itself may 
require skills with which locus of control is correlated: internal individuals may simply be more 
effective searchers. Third, more internal workers may find search effort less bothersome. All three 
scenarios would imply that more internal job seekers would exert more effort looking for work and 
hold out for higher wages.  25 
 
Our experimental design allows us to determine whether these alternative explanations can 
explain the relationship between locus of control and search behavior. Subjects participate in two 
treatments: one in which the return to effort is uncertain and one in which the return to effort is 
common knowledge. In both treatments, the task by which subjects search is the same—meaning that 
a correlation between locus of control and unobserved skill or effort costs cannot explain a difference 
between treatments in the effects of locus of control. A clear treatment effect, however, emerges: 
more internal subjects exert more effort and hold out for higher offers than less internal subjects 
when the return to effort is uncertain, but there is no difference in behavior associated with internality 
when  the  return  to  effort  is  common  knowledge.  Internal  individuals  believe  that  their  actions 
determine  what  happens  to  them.  They  search  harder than  less  internal  individuals  because  they 
believe this effort is more likely to lead to an offer, and because they expect offers to be more likely 
conditional on effort they hold out for higher offers. 
  Understanding how locus of control affects behavior in this abstract search setting has two 
benefits. First, economists can incorporate this understanding of how locus of control influences 
behavior  into  models  of  decision making  in  broad  range  of  contexts.  Any  decision  requiring  an 
individual to expend effort when the payoff to that effort is uncertain could be affected by locus of 
control beliefs. Our study provides guidance concerning how to model locus of control’s effect on 
behavior in these settings and thereby derive testable predictions regarding such behavior. Second 
and  more  importantly,  knowing  how  locus  of  control  affects  behavior  can  guide  policy  to  help 
individuals  overcome  behavioral  biases  that  hinder  their  employment  prospects  and  reduce  their 
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Figure 1a: Word-coding task screenshot for the limited information treatment 
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Figure 1b: Word-coding task screenshot for the full information treatment 
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Figure 3: Partial information treatment information sheet 
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Table 1: Offer distribution 
Offer  Probability 
5  .25 
10  .25 
15  .25 
20  .10 
35  .05 
40  .05 
45  .05 
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Table 2: Summary of experimental sessions 




































42  383  304  0  425  380  $23.98 
(5.02) 
               
Totals  155  1410  1287  326  425  380  $21.88 
(4.00) 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Means and standard deviations of reservation offers and items completed by period 
and treatment 















1  32.10  6.85  31.43  12.12  35  12 
  (12.63)  (3.60)  (10.68)  (3.86)     
  N=155    N=155       
             
2  30.17  10.03  31.89  13.08  35  11 
  (11.37)  (4.09)  (10.75)  (3.65)     
  N=144    N=143       
             
3  30.31  10.63  31.56  13.55  20  11 
  (10.13)  (4.44)  (9.97)  (3.61)     
  N=136    N=126       
             
4  29.14  10.83  29.88  13.73  20  11 
  (9.24)  (4.48)  (10.60)  (3.68)     
  N=125    N=112       
             
5  28.03  11.38  28.59  12.63  20  11 
  (10.23)  (4.29)  (9.90)  (3.61)     
  N=111    N=102       
             
6  27.55  10.94  26.97  12.90  20  10 
  (9.94)  (4.15)  (10.75)  (3.89)     
  N=100    N=93       
             
7  27.31  10.88  28.16  12.12  20  10 
  (9.80)  (4.47)  (10.88)  (3.68)     
  N=88    N=79       
             
8  25.95  9.85  28.14  13.89  20  9 
  (10.22)  (4.52)  (10.34)  (4.02)     
  N=79    N=72       
             
9  25.39  10.24  27.30  13.84  20  9 
  (9.99)  (4.69)  (11.21)  (5.69)     
  N=72    N=63       
             
10  25.74  10.49  25.83  12.92  20  9 
  (9.31)  (4.82)  (10.38)  (3.61)     
  N=65    N=60       
             
11  24.93  10.52  25.56  11.96  20  8 
  (8.86)  (5.25)  (9.60)  (4.02)     
  N=60    N=54       
            Continued  
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Table 3 continued           















12  22.87  10.43  24.89  13.52  20  7 
  (9.25)  (5.09)  (10.77)  (5.03)     
  N=54    N=46       
             
13  24.37  9.96  23.57  14.86  20  7 
  (9.96)  (5.54)  (9.89)  (4.38)     
  N=46    N=42       
             
14  21.47  9.16  25.59  12.88  15  6 
  (8.98)  (5.49)  (9.83)  (4.54)     
  N=38    N=10       
             
15  21.39  8.06  20.19  13.15  15  6 
  (9.10)  (5.89)  (9.00)  (4.10)     
  N=31    N=26       
             
16  21.77  9.12  21.82  12.50  15  5 
  (9.56)  (6.22)  (8.39)  (3.94)     
  N=26    N=22       
             
17  20.70  8.57  20.60  11.00  15  5 
  (8.27)  (5.56)  (8.73)  (5.79)     
  N=23    N=20       
             
18  21.00  7.19  20.88  11.29  15  4 
  (8.57)  (6.42)  (10.04)  (5.59)     
  N=21    N=17       
             
19  18.47  8.32  22.50  11.25  10  3 
  (6.65)  (6.56)  (12.34)  (5.69)     
  N=19    N=12       
             
20  22.94  6.00  18.33  9.22  5  3 
  (11.19)  (6.28)  (12.75)  (5.93)     
  N=17    N=9       
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics  
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Locus of control  12.03  2.43  6  16 
HRS risk preference measure  2.52  1.15  1  4 
GSOEP risk preference measure  3.81  2.02  0  8 
HL risk preference measure  5.51  1.53  0  10 
Optimism pessimism score  16.81  4.46  0  24 
Self esteem score  32.61  4.59  11  40 
Big One score (Extroversion)  33.86  8.28  13  50 
Big Two score (Agreeableness)  39.83  5.49  16  49 
Big Three score (Conscientiousness)  36.40  6.11  17  49 
Big Four score (Emotional stability)  32.79  7.44  13  48 
Big Five score (Intellect)  38.03  5.35  23  49 
SAT Verbal score 
(N=39) 
601.03  102.80  390  780 
SAT Math score 
(N=47) 
727.66  63.29  560  800 
SAT Writing score 
(N=32) 
609.38  83.12  410  750 
ACT score 
(N=96) 
27.68  3.42  17  35 
White  0.64       
Black  0.10       
Other race  0.26       
Male  0.63       
 
Note: Sample size equals 155 unless otherwise noted. Locus of control is increasing in internality. 
The risk preference measures are increasing in risk aversion. Optimism pessimism is increasing in 
optimism (decreasing in pessimism). Self esteem is increasing in an individual’s degree of self 
approval. Big One is increasing in extroversion. Big Two is increasing in agreeableness. Big Three is 
increasing in conscientiousness. Big Four is increasing in emotional stability. Big Five is increasing 
in one’s intellectual orientation or imaginativeness.    36 
 
Table 5: Pairwise correlation coefficients for personality measures 
  LOC  HRS  GSR  HLR  OPP  EST  BG1  BG2  BG3   BG4  BG5 
Locus of control    1.00                     
(LOC)                       
HRS risk (HRS)   0.10   1.00                   
  (0.21)                     
GSOEP risk (GSR)   0.08   0.01   1.00                 
  (0.33)  (0.89)                   
H L risk (HLR)   0.01   0.20   0.26   1.00               
  (0.86)  (0.01)  (0.00)                 
Optimism    0.34   0.07   0.11   0.04  1.00             
pessimism (OPP)  (0.00)  (0.41)  (0.19)  (0.65)               
Self esteem (EST)   0.38   0.03   0.17    0.01  0.57  1.00           
  (0.00)  (0.70)  (0.04)  (0.86)  (0.00)             
Big One (BG1)   0.33   0.17   0.34   0.03  0.24  0.27   1.00         
Extroversion  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.75)  (0.00)  (0.00)           
Big Two (BG2)   0.15   0.01   0.04   0.13  0.14  0.13   0.29   1.00       
Agreeableness  (0.07)  (0.93)  (0.66)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.00)         
Big Three (BG3)   0.30   0.05   0.14   0.03  0.19  0.28   0.02   0.16   1.00     
Conscientiousness  (0.00)  (0.51)  (0.09)  (0.74)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.78)  (0.04)       
Big Four (BG4)   0.18   0.04   0.11   0.14  0.34  0.47   0.02   0.10   0.01  1.00   
Emotional stability  (0.03)  (0.64)  (0.16)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.80)  (0.20)  (0.95)     
Big Five (BG5)   0.11   0.09   0.25   0.03  0.09  0.12   0.28   0.19   0.02  0.01  1.00 
Intellect  (0.17)  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.68)  (0.27)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.85)  (0.85)   
 
Note: Significance levels in parentheses. Locus of control (LOC) is increasing in internality. The risk 
preference measures (HRS, GSR, and HLR) are increasing in risk aversion. Optimism pessimism 
(OPP) is increasing in optimism (decreasing in pessimism). Self esteem (EST) is increasing in an 
individual’s degree of self approval. Big One (BG1) is increasing in extroversion. Big Two (BG2) is 
increasing in agreeableness. Big Three (BG3) is increasing in conscientiousness. Big Four (BG4) is 
increasing in emotional stability. Big Five (BG5) is increasing in one’s intellectual orientation or 
imaginativeness. 37 
 
Table 6: Coefficient estimates for the models of beliefs about the probability of receiving an 
offer in the limited information treatment. 
  Coefficients 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Correctly completed items   1.358***   0.890      
  (0.379)  (0.245)      
Beliefs in period t 1     0.577***   
    (0.049)      
Locus of control       0.149    
      (2.219)    
Risk preferences       2.872    
      (1.906)    
Optimism pessimism       5.197**  
      (2.576)    
Self esteem       3.386    
      (2.642)    
Big One       5.553**  
(Extroversion)      (2.197)    
Big Two       1.172    
(Agreeableness)      (2.087)    
Big Three       6.121*** 
(Conscientiousness)      (2.276)    
Big Four       0.770    
(Emotional Stability)      (2.139)    
Big Five       0.228    
(Intellect)      (2.429)    
Search cost decile       0.676    
      (0.611)    
Period   0.524*     0.607** 
  (0.287)     (0.265)   
Constant  41.329***  11.630***  58.134*** 
  (4.032)      (2.733)     (3.555)    
       
R
2  0.055  0.372  0.116 
Subject period observations  1410  1255  1410 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models are estimated by 
ordinary least squares. Risk preferences are measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Table 7: Coefficient estimates for the models of reservation offers  
  Coefficients 
  Limited information  Full Information 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Beliefs in period t   0.047***             
  (0.016)                
Correctly      0.108**       0.167**     
completed items    (0.050)        (0.075)       
Locus of control       1.156*     0.049**     0.192     0.008 
      (0.593)     (0.023)    (0.708)     (0.028) 
Risk preferences       1.767***   0.065***     0.761      0.016 
      (0.563)     (0.025)    (0.728)     (0.033) 
Optimism        1.086      0.036     1.225     0.021 
pessimism      (0.679)     (0.027)    (0.897)     (0.034) 
Self esteem       0.663      0.021     0.551      0.015 
      (0.848)     (0.036)    (1.102)     (0.050) 
Big One       0.934      0.039     0.121     0.008 
(Extroversion)      (0.743)     (0.029)    (0.876)     (0.035) 
Big Two       0.723      0.036     2.172**    0.082* 
(Agreeableness)      (0.719)     (0.032)    (0.908)     (0.044) 
Big Three       0.631      0.032     0.602      0.022 
(Conscientiousness)      (0.639)     (0.024)    (0.790)     (0.033) 
Big Four       0.084      0.005     0.666      0.019 
(Emot. Stability)      (0.594)     (0.023)    (0.893)     (0.042) 
Big Five       1.468**    0.076**     0.124     0.003 
(Intellect)      (0.606)     (0.031)    (0.651)     (0.027) 
Search cost decile       0.101      0.002     0.532*     0.014 
      (0.214)     (0.009)    (0.286)     (0.013) 
Period   0.630***   0.640***   0.640***   0.025***   0.647***   0.669***   0.023*** 
  (0.084)     (0.083)     (0.078)     (0.003)  (0.104)     (0.101)     (0.004) 
Constant  29.258***  30.355***  32.097***   3.408***  29.739***  34.953***  3.480*** 
  (1.247)     (1.115)     (1.202)     (0.053)  (1.474)     (1.558)     (0.065) 




No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R
2  0.110  0.102  0.160  0.149  0.109  0.147  0.095 
Subject period 
observations 
1410  1410  1410  1,401  1287  1287  1,273 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models are estimated by 
ordinary least squares. Risk preferences are measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Table 8: Coefficient estimates for the models of correctly completed items  
  Coefficients   
Variable  Limited information  Full information 
Beliefs in t 1     
     
Locus of control   0.940**   0.294   
  (0.379)    (0.371)   
Risk preferences   0.556     0.113   
  (0.352)    (0.346)   
Optimism pessimism   0.207     0.297   
  (0.400)    (0.372)   
Self esteem   0.334     0.070   
  (0.463)    (0.415)   
Big One   0.490     0.750** 
(Extroversion)  (0.322)    (0.370)   
Big Two   0.687**   0.093   
(Agreeableness)  (0.297)    (0.310)   
Big Three   0.499     0.409   
(Conscientiousness)  (0.323)    (0.315)   
Big Four   0.206     0.033   
(Emotional Stability)  (0.379)    (0.292)   
Big Five   0.356     0.333   
(Intellect)  (0.359)    (0.273)   
Search cost decile   0.139     0.078   
  (0.114)    (0.118)   
Period   0.005     0.027   
  (0.055)    (0.046)   
Constant  10.570***  13.477*** 
  (0.658)     (0.629)    
     
R
2  0.074  0.057 
Subject period observations  1410  1287 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models are estimated by 
ordinary least squares. Risk preferences are measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Table 9: Estimated marginal effects in pseudo-effort treatment 
  Dependent variables 
  Limited information treatment  Full information treatment 








Locus of control   0.291      3.369      0.509      0.196      0.718    
  (1.948)     (2.882)     (0.448)     (1.284)     (0.605)    
Risk preferences   0.481      0.676      0.091      3.830**    0.547    
  (2.122)     (2.813)     (0.783)     (1.539)     (0.698)    
Optimism pessimism   0.783      3.165      0.636      1.513      2.060*** 
  (2.683)     (3.128)     (0.725)     (1.160)     (0.633)    
Self esteem   7.903**    8.217*     2.988***   3.242*     0.252    
  (3.409)     (4.529)     (0.737)     (1.628)     (0.652)    
Big One   5.781      2.464      0.014      2.231*     0.630    
(Extroversion)  (3.865)     (3.930)     (0.604)     (1.221)     (0.506)    
Big Two   2.646      1.237      0.592      0.124      1.529**  
(Agreeableness)  (2.411)     (1.783)     (0.550)     (1.513)     (0.673)    
Big Three   7.701**    1.162      0.582      1.345      1.101    
(Conscientiousness)  (3.722)     (2.627)     (0.926)     (1.334)     (0.706)    
Big Four   2.807      4.920      1.020      0.319      1.522**  
(Emotional Stability)  (3.130)     (3.764)     (0.783)     (1.477)     (0.600)    
Big Five   2.606      5.557**    0.228      2.061*     0.206    
(Intellect)  (2.827)     (2.436)     (0.523)     (1.180)     (0.445)    
Period   0.315      0.227      0.251**    0.337**    0.385*** 
  (0.369)     (0.327)     (0.104)     (0.165)     (0.102)    
Constant  41.810***  31.426***   9.607***  30.391***  14.304*** 
  (3.376)     (3.584)     (0.918)     (1.685)     (0.903)    
           
R
2  0.175  0.130  0.179  0.238  0.229 
Subject period 
observations 
425  425  425  380  380 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models are estimated by 
ordinary least squares. Risk preferences are measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Table 10: Estimated marginal effects employing Holt-Laury risk preference measure in 
preferred specifications 
  Limited information treatment  Full information treatment 














Locus of control   0.450      0.980      0.886**    0.069**    0.222      0.296      0.038   
  (2.094)     (0.625)     (0.388)     (0.035)     (0.735)     (0.354)     (0.027)    
Risk preferences   4.235**    0.891*     0.050      0.025      1.032      0.213      0.016    
  (1.644)     (0.526)     (0.364)     (0.032)     (0.776)     (0.386)     (0.026)    
Optimism    5.101**    1.094      0.223      0.015      1.160      0.286      0.030    
pessimism  (2.442)     (0.714)     (0.399)     (0.039)     (0.877)     (0.362)     (0.026)    
Self esteem   3.019      0.573      0.332      0.006      0.599      0.058      0.032    
  (2.734)     (0.846)     (0.473)     (0.037)     (1.090)     (0.413)     (0.026)    
Big One   6.107***   1.219      0.569*     0.014      0.277      0.775**    0.028    
(Extroversion)  (2.176)     (0.790)     (0.333)     (0.035)     (0.865)     (0.387)     (0.029)    
Big Two   1.673      0.775      0.654**    0.005      1.968**    0.128      0.027    
(Agreeableness)  (2.106)     (0.742)     (0.310)     (0.032)     (0.875)     (0.305)     (0.024)    
Big Three   5.418**    0.380      0.455      0.024      0.605      0.411      0.066*** 
(Conscientiousness)  (2.224)     (0.686)     (0.325)     (0.032)     (0.802)     (0.318)     (0.027)    
Big Four   1.602      0.262      0.214      0.084**    0.594      0.023      0.018    
(Emot. Stability)  (2.011)     (0.632)     (0.392)     (0.035)     (0.907)     (0.296)     (0.020)    
Big Five   0.115      1.597**    0.331      0.012      0.040      0.343      0.000    
(Intellect)  (2.350)     (0.612)     (0.347)     (0.035)     (0.650)     (0.249)     (0.023)    
Search cost decile   0.761      0.097      0.127      0.006      0.509*     0.072      0.003   
  (0.611)     (0.224)     (0.116)     (0.012)     (0.284)     (0.111)     (0.008)    
Period   0.628**    0.660***   0.012      0.020***   0.662***   0.026      0.005*  
  (0.277)     (0.080)     (0.054)     (0.005)     (0.097)     (0.044)     (0.003)    
Constant  58.382***  32.152***  10.568***    34.821***  13.448***   
  (3.544)     (1.252)     (0.665)       (1.522)     (0.585)      
               
R
2  0.126  0.140  0.062  0.085  0.150  0.058  0.086 
Subject period 
observations 
1410  1410  1410  1410  1287  1287  1287 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models in columns 1 3 
and 4 5 are estimated by ordinary least squares. Columns 4 and 7 report the marginal effects from 
probit models of the probability of quitting estimated by maximum likelihood. Pseudo R
2s reported 
for the probit models. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10%   42 
 
Table 11: Estimated marginal effects including achievement scores in preferred specifications 
  Limited information Treatment  Full information treatment 














Locus of control   1.026      1.291      0.571      0.088**    0.287      0.606*     0.021  
  (2.460)     (0.822)     (0.377)     (0.041)     (0.783)     (0.357)     (0.025)    
Risk preferences   2.803      1.433**    0.742*     0.062*     0.925      0.125      0.004    
  (2.124)     (0.711)     (0.427)     (0.036)     (0.887)     (0.394)     (0.017)    
Optimism    2.598      0.715      0.332      0.025      1.896*     0.450      0.011    
pessimism  (2.411)     (0.770)     (0.417)     (0.043)     (1.029)     (0.430)     (0.025)    
Self esteem   1.749      0.337      0.564      0.021      0.370      0.080      0.029    
  (2.540)     (0.944)     (0.467)     (0.045)     (1.260)     (0.437)     (0.023)    
Big One   6.208**    1.040      0.364      0.001      0.094      0.545      0.014    
(Extroversion)  (2.385)     (0.902)     (0.366)     (0.045)     (1.048)     (0.409)     (0.025)    
Big Two   3.146      1.134      0.666*     0.020      2.497***   0.232      0.043    
(Agreeableness)  (2.147)     (0.792)     (0.362)     (0.038)     (0.920)     (0.323)     (0.028)    
Big Three   6.830***   0.610      0.376      0.011      0.968      0.098      0.037*  
(Conscientiousness)  (2.418)     (0.860)     (0.364)     (0.034)     (0.903)     (0.315)     (0.021)    
Big Four   0.334      0.271      0.127      0.132***   1.544      0.442      0.042*   
(Emot. Stability)  (2.303)     (0.739)     (0.443)     (0.044)     (1.005)     (0.356)     (0.022)    
Big Five   0.979      1.306*     0.429      0.006      0.202      0.465      0.013    
(Intellect)  (2.547)     (0.729)     (0.422)     (0.041)     (0.761)     (0.288)     (0.021)    
Search cost decile   0.716      0.016      0.060      0.013      0.462      0.208      0.009    
  (0.673)     (0.273)     (0.135)     (0.014)     (0.351)     (0.125)     (0.007)    
Achievement score   0.948      0.729      0.909**    0.085**    0.335      0.988***   0.052*** 
  (1.970)     (0.787)     (0.364)     (0.039)     (0.740)     (0.340)     (0.018)    
Period   0.719**    0.630***   0.033      0.018***   0.660***   0.031      0.003    
  (0.275)     (0.084)     (0.054)     (0.005)     (0.118)     (0.050)     (0.002)    
Constant  58.160***  31.400***  10.156***    34.445***  14.309***   
  (3.683)     (1.446)     (0.761)       (1.929)     (0.642)      
               
R
2  0.107  0.159  0.091  0.119  0.160  0.115  0.143 
Subject period 
observations 
1132  1132  1132  1132  1019  1019  1019 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models in columns 1 3 
and 4 5 are estimated by ordinary least squares. Columns 4 and 7 report the marginal effects from 
probit models of the probability of quitting estimated by maximum likelihood. Pseudo R
2s reported 
for the probit models. Risk preferences are measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Table 12: Estimated marginal effects in the partial information treatment 
  Dependent variable 






Probability of quitting 
(4) 
Locus of control   15.664**    1.041      0.075      0.019 
  (5.820)     (1.838)     (0.663)     (0.087) 
Risk preferences   0.862      0.695      0.734      0.003 
  (4.684)     (2.082)     (0.514)     (0.089) 
Optimism pessimism  12.299**    1.470      2.024***   0.067 
  (6.011)     (1.395)     (0.715)     (0.090) 
Self esteem  16.185*     5.265**    2.042***   0.025 
  (8.405)     (2.224)     (0.599)     (0.147) 
Big One   6.012      3.415*     0.831*     0.074 
(Extroversion)  (5.613)     (1.796)     (0.475)     (0.088) 
Big Two  10.955      0.700      0.297      0.141 
(Agreeableness)  (6.845)     (2.658)     (0.564)     (0.106) 
Big Three   3.058      2.329      0.295      0.042 
(Conscientiousness)  (5.388)     (2.100)     (0.457)     (0.086) 
Big Four   12.700*     0.834      0.154      0.093 
(Emotional Stability)  (7.225)     (2.008)     (0.687)     (0.129) 
Big Five   6.036      1.858      1.026**    0.125 
(Intellect)  (4.966)     (1.742)     (0.437)     (0.087) 
Search cost decile   2.686*     0.786      0.140      0.045 
  (1.573)     (0.613)     (0.181)     (0.031) 
Period   0.309      0.060      0.123*     0.010 
  (0.455)     (0.141)     (0.064)     (0.006) 
Constant  69.555***  29.622***  12.075***   
  (8.088)     (4.117)     (1.108)      
           
R
2  0.309  0.183  0.287   
Subject period 
observations 
326  326  326  326 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The models in columns 1 3 are 
estimated by ordinary least squares. The last column reports the marginal effects from the probit 
model of the probability of quitting estimated by maximum likelihood. Risk preferences are 
measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Table 13: Estimated marginal effects in Probit models of the probability of “quitting”  
  Marginal effects 
Variable  Limited information   Full information  
Locus of control   0.075**    0.039    
  (0.034)     (0.028)    
Risk preferences   0.050     0.003    
  (0.030)     (0.021)    
Optimism pessimism   0.012      0.033    
  (0.038)     (0.027)    
Self esteem   0.005      0.031    
  (0.038)     (0.026)    
Search cost decile   0.007      0.002    
  (0.011)     (0.008)    
Big One   0.007      0.028    
(Extroversion)  (0.035)     (0.027)    
Big Two   0.003      0.025 
(Agreeableness)  (0.032)     (0.026)    
Big Three   0.026   0.066**    
(Conscientiousness)  (0.030)     (0.027)    
Big Four   0.089**      0.018    
(Emotional Stability)  (0.035)     (0.020)    
Big Five   0.010      0.001    
(Intellect)  (0.036)     (0.024)    
Period   0.020***   0.005*   
  (0.005)     (0.003)    
     
Pseudo R
2  0.095  0.083 
Subject period observations  1410  1287 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The probit models are 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Risk preferences are 
measured using the lottery question from the HRS. 
*** — significant at 1%   **   — significant at 5%   *     — significant at 10% 
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Appendix – For online publication only 
 
Instructions: Limited Information Treatment 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making.  The instructions are simple, and 
if you follow them carefully, you may earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will 
be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment. 
Part 1: Structure 
This experiment is broken up into 2 episodes, and each episode will be broken up into 21 periods.  In 
the  first  period  of  both  episodes,  you  will  be  asked  to  complete  a  word  coding  task,  which  is 
explained below in Part 2.  The number of items you complete in the word coding task may affect 
whether or not you receive an offer during a period.  Each offer is an amount denominated in an 
Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), where the exchange rate between dollars and ECUs is $1=100 
ECUs.  If you do not receive an offer or you receive an offer but choose not accept it, you receive 15 
ECUs for that period and move on to the next period in which you will again complete the word 
coding task. If you accept an offer at any point, you receive 15 ECUs for that period and the amount 
of the accepted offer for every remaining period. In the 21
st period, you will only receive ECUs if you 
have accepted an offer.  If you turn down an offer in a period, it is possible that you will not receive 
another in future periods, but it is also possible that you will receive an offer higher than the one you 
have turned down.  There are 7 possible offers. If you receive an offer, the table below gives the 
chances that it will be one of these 7 offers. 
 
Offer  Probability 
5 ECU  0.25 — or 25 times out of 100 
10 ECU  0.25 — or 25 times out of 100 
15 ECU  0.25 — or 25 times out of 100 
20 ECU  0.10 —or 10 times out of 100 
35 ECU  0.05 — or 5 times out of 100 
40 ECU  0.05 — or 5 times out of 100 
45 ECU  0.05 — or 5 times out of 100 
   
Your earnings will be based on the amounts you receive in each period.  Examples: 
Ex. 1 
You do not receive any offers or you turn down every offer received in the first 20 periods. You will 
receive 15 ECUs per period for periods 1 through 20. You will not receive anything in the 21
st period 
because you have not accepted an offer.  In this example, the earnings are 
(20 x 15 ECUs) = 300 ECUs 
Ex. 2 
You do not accept any offers in periods 1 9.  In period 10 you accept an offer of 45.  Your earnings 
will be 15 ECUs for periods 1 through 10, and 45 ECU for periods 11 through 21.  In this example, 
your earnings are: 
(10 x 15 ECUs) + (11 x 45 ECUs) = 150 + 495 = 645 ECUs 
Ex. 3 
You turn down an offer of 5 ECUs in period 1 and accept an offer of 20 ECUs in period 2.  You earn 
15 ECUs for the first 2 periods and 20 ECUs for the remaining 19 periods. Your earnings will be 




You do not receive offers or you reject all offers received in periods 1 through 16. In the 17
th period 
you accept an offer of 40.  Your earnings will be 15 ECUs for every period before and including the 
period in which you accept an offer (irrespective of whether you did not receive an offer or received 
an offer and turned it down), and the amount you accepted, 40 ECUs, for every period after you 
accepted your offer through the 21
st period.  In this example, the earnings are 
(17 x 15 ECUs)  + (4 x 40 ECUs) = 255 + 160 = 415 ECUs 
 
After you complete the word coding task, but before you see if you have received an offer, you will 
be asked to answer three questions: 
1)  How many items do you think you correctly completed? 
2)  What do you think the probability is that you receive an offer? 
3)  If you receive an offer in this period, what would the offer have to be for you to accept it? 
 
Answers to the second question should be a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means “there is a 
0% chance that I will receive an offer,” 1 means “there is a 1% chance that I will receive an offer,” 
and so on up to 100 which means “there is a 100% chance that I will receive an offer.” 
 
After answering the questions, you will learn whether or not you received an offer.  If you received 
an offer, you can choose to either accept the offer and receive that amount for all the remaining 
periods, or reject the offer and move on to the word coding task in the next period. 
 
In  each  period  before  you  accept  an  offer,  you  will  engage  in  the  word  coding  task,  answering 
questions, and choosing whether or not to accept an offer if you have received one.  For the periods 
after you have accepted an offer, you will be told what the current period is and what your earnings 
are for that period (i.e., the offer you have accepted).  If everyone has accepted an offer, the program 
will  automatically  calculate  your  earnings  for  the  remaining  periods  and  skip  to  the  end  of  the 
episode.   
 
Part 2: Word Coding Task 
You will have a maximum of 90 seconds for the word coding task during any period before you have 
accepted an offer.  A key will be given on the top, left hand side of your screen.  This key will pair 
ten words with ten 4 digit numbers. Below this key will be a list of seven words, each of which is 
followed  by  five  4 digit  numbers.   To  complete  the  task  for  each  word  listed,  select  the  4 digit 
number that is paired with that word in the key. You can move on to a new set of word number 
pairings by clicking the “Next Set” button at the bottom of your screen to complete more items.  
Although you have a maximum of 90 seconds to complete as many items as you wish in the word 
coding task, you may stop at any point by clicking on the “Stop” button at the bottom of the screen. 
Part 3: Questionnaire 
After completing both episodes you will complete a questionnaire. 
Part 4: Payoffs 
At the end of today’s session you will receive your earnings from both episodes plus your earnings 
from part of the questionnaire.  In addition, all subjects will receive a $6 participation fee. 
Are there any questions? 
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Instructions: Full Information Treatment 
 
For this second episode, the probability that you receive an offer will be equal to 0.04 times the 
number of correctly completed items.  If this number is larger than 1, you will definitely receive an 
offer.  Consider the following examples: 
Ex. 1 
You correctly complete 12 items.  The probability that you receive an offer is 
0.04 x 12 = 0.48, or 48% 
 
Ex. 2 
You correctly complete 19 items.  The probability that you receive an offer is 
0.04 x 19 = 0.76, or 76% 
 
Ex. 3 
You correctly complete 6 items.  The probability that you receive an offer is 
0.04 x 6 = 0.24, or 24% 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Abbreviated 4-item Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale 
A. What happens to me is my own doing. 
B. Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is taking. 
 
A. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
B. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or 
bad fortune.  
 
A. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
B. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
 
A. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me. 
B. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. 
 
HRS/NLSY79 Risk Preference 
A. Now I have another kind of question. Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, 
and you have a good job guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You 
are given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50 50 chance that it will double 
your (family) income and a 50 50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you 
take the new job? 
Yes (go to B) 
No (go to C) 
 
B. Suppose the chances were 50 50 that it would double your (family) income and 50 50 that it 
would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job? 
Yes (go to end) 
No (go to end) 
 
C. Suppose the chances were 50 50 that it would double your (family) income and 50 50 that it 
would cut it by 20 percent. Would you take the new job? 
Yes (go to end) 
No (go to end) 
 
GSOEP Risk Preference 
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? 
Rate  yourself  from  0  to  10,  where  0  means  “unwilling  to  take  any  risks”  and  10  means  “fully 
prepared to take risks.” 
 
Holt-Laury Low Stakes Risk Preference 
In the questions that follow, you are going to be asked to make ten decisions.    Each decision will be 
between Option A and Option B.  Please enter your decisions below and on the corresponding sheet 
that was handed out to you.  Only one of the ten choices you make will be used to determine your 
earnings for this part of the experiment.  After you answer all 10 questions you will be shown the 
"decision selected" and "outcome" which will be used to calculate your earnings.  Be sure to write 
these down.  Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B." You will make 
ten choices.  Before you start making your ten choices, let me explain what these choices mean.  49 
 
Imagine a ten sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10.  
After you have made all of your choices, the die would be thrown twice, once to select one of the ten 
decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A 
or B, for the particular decision selected.  Given this, you should make the choice that you would 
prefer if we were throwing the die for real.  Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays 
200 pennies if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays 160 pennies if the throw is 2 10. Option 
B yields 385 pennies if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays 10 pennies if the throw is 2 10. The other 
Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for 
each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each 
option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 200 pennies or 385 pennies. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose between 
Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows, and you 
may change your decisions and make them in any order. 
 
  Option A  Option B  Your Choice 
1.  1/10 of $2.00   9/10 of $1.60  1/10 of $3.85   9/10 of $0.10  A / B 
2.  2/10 of $2.00   8/10 of $1.60  2/10 of $3.85   8/10 of $0.10  A / B 
3.  3/10 of $2.00   7/10 of $1.60  3/10 of $3.85   7/10 of $0.10  A / B 
4.  4/10 of $2.00   6/10 of $1.60  4/10 of $3.85   6/10 of $0.10  A / B 
5.  5/10 of $2.00   5/10 of $1.60  5/10 of $3.85   5/10 of $0.10  A / B 
6.  6/10 of $2.00   4/10 of $1.60  6/10 of $3.85   4/10 of $0.10  A / B 
7.  7/10 of $2.00   3/10 of $1.60  7/10 of $3.85   3/10 of $0.10  A / B 
8.  8/10 of $2.00   2/10 of $1.60  8/10 of $3.85   2/10 of $0.10  A / B 
9.  9/10 of $2.00   1/10 of $1.60  9/10 of $3.85   1/10 of $0.10  A / B 




Using the response scale provided, let us know how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. 
 
A = I agree a lot 
B = I agree a little 
C = I neither agree nor disagree 
D = I disagree a little 
E = I disagree a lot 
 
In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 50 
 
If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
I'm always optimistic about my future. 
I hardly ever expect things to go my way. 
I rarely count on good things happening to me. 
Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 








I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 
I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
I certainly feel useless at times. 
At times I think I am no good at all. 
 
Cost Questions 
We would like to get a sense for your opinion of the word matching we had you do.  Imagine that you 
had to complete some items in the word matching task, but you have the option to pay money to be 
excused from completing some of them.  Please tell us how much you would be willing to pay, in 
dollars, to be excused from different numbers of items.  For example, an answer of $0.01 means you 
would pay 1 cent, and an answer of $2 means that you would be willing to pay $2.  Please consider 
the  questions  and  answer  them  seriously  (i.e.  paying  $1  billion  to  avoid  doing  one  item  seems 
unlikely).  Your answers can vary down to the penny.  Raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
How much would you be willing to pay to avoid completing 4 items? 
How much would you be willing to pay to avoid completing 8 items? 
How much would you be willing to pay to avoid completing 12 items? 
How much would you be willing to pay to avoid completing 16 items? 
How much would you be willing to pay to avoid completing 20 items? 
How much would you be willing to pay to avoid completing 24 items? 
 
 
 
 
 